By 1970, regulation of railroads under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 had resulted in an industry that was in financial ruin and unresponsive to changes in the marketplace.
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. railroad industry has been federally regulated since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (ICA).
1 Provisions of the ICA and its amendments over the next 60 years were designed to encourage agreements among railroads to stabilize prices. Part of the policy was to limit the ability of railroads to enter or exit markets by requiring regulatory approval based on "public convenience and necessity".
With the rise of truck competition and the growing importance of products that could be moved efficiently by trucks, railroads' traffic levels eroded, and they were left with large networks with many low density lines. The regulatory system's pricing and routing restrictions hampered competitive responses.
2 By the mid-1970s, the industry was in financial ruin. There had been multiple bankruptcies, and the major Eastern railroads had been effectively nationalized in 1976 with the creation of CONRAIL, which required substantial federal subsidies. 3 Nationwide, railroad facilities and service had significantly deteriorated.
In hopes of restoring the freight rail system to financial and operational health without 1 A special issue of the Review of Industrial Organization (2013) (Vol 43) considered the impetus for the legislation (Brown (2013) , Henrickson and Wilson (2013) , Peoples (2013) ), for and the effects of this legislation (Blonigen and Cristea (2013) ). It was passed during a period of enormous growth (Wilson (2013) , high prices, and discriminatory prices (Boyer (2013) , Brennan (2013), and MacDonald (2013) ). 2 These are discussed more completely in TRB (2015), Keeler (1983) , Wilson and Burton (2004) , Gallamore (1999) , Gallamore and Meyer (2014) and others.
3 By mid-1970s, railroads were going bankrupt, and about one-fifth of trackage was operated by bankrupt and bailed-out railroads (GAO 1990, 10) . As noted by Keeler (1983, pp. 16-17) an estimated 47 percent of freight rail revenues were being earned by railroads that could no longer be considered financially viable.
(1) assist the railroads of the Nation in rehabilitating the rail system in order to meet the demands of interstate commerce and the national defense;
(2) reform Federal regulatory policy so as to preserve a safe, adequate, economical, efficient, and financially stable rail system; (3) assist the rail system to remain viable in the private sector of the economy;
(4) provide a regulatory process that balances the needs of carriers, shippers, and the public; and (5) assist in the rehabilitation and financing of the rail system.
Staggers substantially modified railroad regulation by placing greater reliance on the market to yield reasonable rates, and accordingly reducing regulatory control of entry and exit and other decisions, while providing shippers protection against unreasonable rates when competition was not present. As is discussed in the next section, this legislation has enabled dramatic changes in the railroad industry. Sciences to conduct a study to examine and make recommendations on:
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(1) The performance of the nation's major railroads regarding service levels, service quality, and rates;
(2) The projected demand for freight transportation over the next two decades and the constraints limiting the railroads' ability to meet that demand;
(3) The effectiveness of public policy in balancing the need for railroads to earn adequate returns with those of shippers for reasonable rates and adequate service; and (4) The future role of the Surface Transportation Board in regulating railroad rates, service levels, and the railroads' common carrier obligations, particularly as railroads may become revenue adequate.
Funds for the study were appropriated in 2012; the study, in which the authors participated, 6 began in 2013; and the Study Committee released its report (TRB 2015) in June 2015. The Study Committee's 4 There are also a wide range of both government reports as well as academic papers that hit on these issues as well. Government reports include: GAO (1987 GAO ( , 1990 GAO ( , 1999 GAO ( , 2006 , USDA (2004) , and of course, the report on which this paper is based (TRB Special Report 318, 2015) , while academic works include Keeler (1983) , McFarland (1989) , Barnekov and Kliet (1990) , Burton (1993) , Wilson (1994; 1997) , MacDonald and Cavalluzzo (1996) , Winston (1998) ; Winston et al. (1990) and others. 5 Public Law 109-59, Section 9007. 6 Schmalensee served as Chair of the Study Committee.
fundamental conclusion was that while the regulatory system developed under Staggers was a sensible response to the problems of freight rail in 1980, it is no longer a good fit for today's very different industry. As we discuss below, the Committee offered a number of recommendations for modernizing freight rail regulation.
In the next section, we provide a brief summary of the post-Staggers evolution of the freight rail industry. Section III describes the current system of rate regulation and summarizes the study's recommendations for changing that system. Section IV deals with the modernization of policy with respect to monitoring revenue adequacy, evaluating mergers, and collecting and disseminating data, and Section V offers some conclusions.
II. THE POST-STAGGERS FREIGHT RAIL INDUSTRY
Railroads move thousands of commodities 7 between thousands of origins and destinations over vast networks; and, in some cases, movements occur from one railroad's network to another railroad's network (a "joint movement"). The fixed and sunk network costs are enormous but generate no revenue directly, and there can be tremendous differences in the marginal costs of each movement. The network costs must be paid for by markups on marginal costs; but origins, destinations, and commodities differ dramatically in terms of competitive pressures on markups.
II.a Rates and Costs
The Staggers Act substantially reduced the scope of rate regulation and placed more reliance on market competition in several ways: First, the Act ended collective pricing through rate bureaus by allowing two or more railroads to set rates jointly only when each is directly involved in the interline 7 The Standard Transportation Commodity Codes (STCC) are typically used to identify commodities shipped. These are maintained by RailInc. In these data, there are in excess of 9600 seven-digit codes, each representing a different commodity. In the Carload Waybill Statistics, maintained by the Surface Transportation Board (STB), there are movements of over 9500 commodities (STCC level seven codes) between 18,961 origins (Standard Point Location Codes) and 17,224 terminal locations (Standard Point Location Codes) from 1984-2013. These account for about 1.7 million different origin-destinationcommodity triples. movement. Second, broad classes of traffic for which railroads faced significant intermodal competition (in practice, from trucks) could be exempted from regulation entirely. Third, it legalized confidential contracts between shippers and railroads, the terms of which were exempted from regulatory oversight.
Fourth, railroads were free to set rates for common carrier movements --i.e., non-exempt and noncontract movements --though shippers that felt that they were being charged unreasonable rates could make use of a regulatory review process. We describe this process in Section III and present recommendations for its reform.
These changes in regulation had immediate and significant effects: The ICC quickly exempted entire categories of commodities and railroad car types from regulation --including, boxcars, intermodal, shipments of fruits and vegetable carried in refrigerated box cars --and the use of confidential contracts became widespread. These changes are reflected in Table 1 , which makes it clear that exemptions and contracting dominate railroads' shipments, carloads, ton-miles and revenue. As a result, only about 8 percent in 2000 and 6 percent in 2013 of shipments are subject to regulatory review. Higher percentages of carloads, ton-miles, and revenue are subject to regulatory review, which reflects the fact that exempt commodities are typically shipped in smaller quantities than are non-exempt commodities.
Insert Table 1 The long-term change in rates since Staggers is equally dramatic. As shown in Figure 1 , the average real rate per tonmile has fallen substantially over time which reflects the effects of deregulation directly but also indirectly through changes in the traffic mix. In 1975, real rates were about 6.5 cents per ton-mile and remained about at that level until 1981, just after the Staggers Rail Act was passed.
Thereafter, rates fell continuously and substantially through 2003. They have risen somewhat since.
Insert Figure 1
Much of the initial decrease reflects the adoption by the railroads of policies that had been restricted by regulation, including pricing innovations, the use of larger cars, the consolidation of traffic into multiple car and unit train shipments, and other sources of efficiency gains. In addition, large railroads shed substantial amounts of low-volume branch lines and restructured labor agreements. These changes led to reductions in fuel, materials and labor costs per ton-mile and longer average lengths of haul, multiple (and contract) shipments, etc. As discussed below, there was also a tremendous consolidation of railroads, which reduces interchange, facilitates coordination, and allows economics of density to be realized.
Figure 2 provides a representation of real rates relative to those in 1989 as well as a measure of unit input costs. 8 As can be seen in this figure, the reduction of rates in the 1990s was dramatic, but unit input costs fell even faster. shows this), while unit costs (RCAF-A) stabilized (but became more volatile). There are several reasons for these changes: First, Table 2 shows that the size of the overall railroad network measured by miles of road or miles of track fell considerably from 1980 through 2013 while output (ton-miles) grew dramatically. 9 These changes increased congestion and may have led to higher fuel costs. Second, beginning in 2003, fuel prices began to rise, and rose by non-trivial amounts, which again put upward pressure on costs and associated rates. In 2003, the real price per gallon of diesel fuel was $1.03; it rose to $3.12 by 2008 (AAR, Railroad Facts, various years). Third, the recession led to declines in both traffic levels and rates in 2009. Finally, through the 1980s and 1990s, the number of railroads fell, primarily due to mergers. Naturally, shippers worry that this consolidation has reduced competition and led to higher rates and poorer service, particularly for so-called "captive shippers": shippers that have no or limited competitive options for transportation services. 8 The unit input costs are measured by the STB's productivity-adjusted "rail cost adjustment factor" (RCAF-A). It summarizes railroads unit-of-output costs and represents the net effects of input price changes and productivity changes. More information can be found on the STB's website and the American Association of Railroads (http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/rcaf.html and https://www.aar.org/data-center/rail-cost-indexes). 9 Miles of road is a commonly used measure of network size. It measures the non-redundant miles in the network. Miles of track includes all track miles in the network. From Table 2 , the ratio of miles of track to miles of road has remained essentially constant for Class I railroads between 1975 and 2013.
Insert Figure 2
One of the primary foci of the 1970s regulatory reform legislation was to improve the financial viability of the freight rail industry. As Figure 2 might suggest, Figure 3 shows that the return on investment in this industry as calculated by the STB, while quite volatile, has improved from less than 2 percent in the later part of the 1970s to over 12 percent in 2012.
Insert Figure 3

II.b Railroad Networks and Market Structure
The Staggers Act modified the ICC's long-standing authority to approve abandonments and mergers. In the case of abandonments, Staggers established a time limit for approval and allowed railroads to present evidence on whether the line was earning its cost of capital. In the case of mergers, the railroads' exemption from normal antitrust review was retained, and the ICC was instructed to continue to review mergers under a broad "public interest" standard that allows consideration of factors other than impacts on competition and efficiency including, importantly, the impact of the merger on the economic health of other railroads.
Under this more liberal regime, the Class I railroads rapidly made substantial changes in their networks through abandonment and sales of branch lines and consolidation through mergers. 10 As Table   2 10 In 2013, there were seven Class I railroads in the US. Class I status is based on an operating threshold that changes over time. In 2013, the threshold was annual revenues of $467 million or more (Class I Railroad Statistics, American Association of Railroads, 2015) . These railroads account for over 90 percent of industry revenues, and operate nearly 70 percent of railroad miles of road (AAR, Railroad Facts).
Insert Table 2
The post-Staggers easing of merger policy has also had a major effect. The industry has been transformed from 68 Class I railroads in 1975 to 40 in 1980, and since 1980, through a series of mergers, reclassifications, and bankruptcies the number fell to only 7 in 2002, and has remained steady since then (Table 2 ).
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The effect of this consolidation and increases in traffic on firm sizes has been dramatic ( Table 2 ).
While the total Class I rail network has fallen, ton-miles of traffic has grown substantially. Despite sales and abandonments of track, average miles of road per Class I railroad grew appreciably through the 1980s until about 2000 and has held steady since then at about 14,000 miles: about 4.8 times the 1975 level.
Average ton-miles per Class I railroad, however, grew by a factor of 22 between 1975 and 2013. Figure 4 shows the changes in these variables relative to their 1975 levels. Note that growth of both has slowed in recent years. But over the whole period, these changes point to a much more streamlined rail network, more intensively utilized, which may enable the realization of economies of density and associated cost savings. 
Insert Figure 4
III. RATE REGULATION
The Staggers Act freed railroads to set whatever rates they pleased but provided protection against unreasonable rates for shippers that were using common carrier rates (as opposed to negotiated contract rates) for shipments that have not been exempted from regulation entirely. (As Table 1 shows, such shipments have been a relatively small fraction of total traffic in recent years.) An aggrieved shipper must file a challenge with the Surface Transportation Board (STB).
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By law, any common carrier rate is considered reasonable if it is less than 180 percent of "variable cost", which is discussed below (Eaton and Center (1985) and Wilson (1996) ). The 180 percent standard lacks any theoretical basis. 14 Even if a rate exceeds this threshold, the shipper is not entitled to relief unless the railroad has "market dominance": i.e., does not face effective competition.
If the rate exceeds the threshold and the railroad is found to have market dominance, the STB assesses whether the rate is reasonable or not reasonable. If it finds the rate is not reasonable, the STB can award the shipper reparations and prescribe the maximum rate that the railroad can charge for future movements (49 USC §11704(b), §10704(a)(1)). In assessing reasonability, the STB is to be respectful of the law's overarching policies (49 USC §10101), including the policy that railroads must be able to earn "adequate revenues." Adequate revenues are defined as those "sufficient-under honest, economical, and 12 There was a definitional change that required the inclusion of terminal delay in in train hours beginning in 1980. This means that the numbers before and after 1980 are not comparable; such comparisons understate the increase in output per train hour. 13 The STB was created in 1996 to assume some of the regulatory functions of the ICC when the latter was abolished. The STB operated within the Department of Transportation until December 18, 2015, when Public Law No. 114-110 took effect and it became an independent agency. 14 However, the fact that the standard exceeds 100 percent could be interpreted as a rough-and-ready acknowledgement that common network costs have to be covered by (at least) some rates that exceed variable costs.
efficient management-to cover operating expenses, support prudent capital outlays, repay a reasonable debt level, raise needed equity capital, and otherwise attract and retain capital in amounts adequate to provide a sound rail transportation system" (49 USC §10701(d)(2), §10704(a) (2)).
III.a The Uniform Railroad Costing System (URCS) 15
The ICC had a long history of trying to measure the costs of railroad services and activities. Initially, the ICC used Rail Form A, which was introduced in 1939. It was a system for allocating accounting costs by formula to railroad services and activities. The laws that partially deregulated the industry directed the agency to develop an updated method to determine "economically accurate railroad costs directly and indirectly associated with particular movements of goods, including the variable costs associated with particular movements." 16 In response, the ICC developed the Uniform Railroad Costing System (URCS), which again is a system that allocates accounting costs to services and activities that has much in common with Rail Form A. It is not solidly based on economic theory or on rigorous engineering or statistical analysis of actual railroad operations. Both during its development and since its adoption as the official costing methodology in 1989, its use has been questioned.
The legislation that led to the development of URCS did not provide regulators with clear guidance as to how the "variable cost" of a specific movement should be defined or computed. As noted earlier, railroads produce an enormous number of movements, which vary dramatically across commodity, distance traveled, tons carried, travel time, location etc.; and there are significant portions of costs that are joint or common costs. Common costs are particularly bothersome, since such costs cannot be apportioned to a particular movement without the use of an arbitrary cost allocation mechanism.
15 For a more detailed discussion of URCS, see Wilson and Wolak (2016) . 16 Cost accounting principles in Title III, Section 301, §11162 of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.
The URCS consists of three different phases: In Phase I, massive amounts of financial, operating and special studies are used to develop a database. 17 These data are allocated into 15 different activity groupings e.g., running crew wages, running track maintenance, etc. (Bitzan and Wilson 2003) . Linear regressions are then run on each of the 15 different activity group costs to link the specific expenses to particular measures of railroad activities and to model how costs change with changes in the activity levels.
In Phase II, a set of computer programs transform the database and statistical results into a set of tables that reflect specific tasks or calculations. These are used to calculate unit costs and provide the information to derive system-average unit costs that are associated with specific rail activities.
Phase III, is the final program. Users can specify specific movement characteristics: e.g., commodity, distance, cars, etc. The program will estimate locomotive unit miles, switch engine minutes, etc., and used the results of Phase II to calculate the cost of a movement.
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There are many issues with this process: 19 First, URCS costs are not consistent with a welldefined economic cost function. Rather, the methodology of establishing particular costs is based on an accounting procedure where aggregated expense items are allocated among different activities. The costs assigned to each activity is a composite of several different accounting measures, and the allocations into 15 categories are such that substitution effects between the activities are not considered. Second, some categories of costs that impact decision-making are not reflected. For example, costs that are related to system congestion and associated delays affect railroad decisions, but are not reflected in reported costs.
Third, the allocation of costs into fixed and variable components is generally done by linear regression, but in other cases engineering information from decades ago or expert judgment is employed. The former disallows increasing or decreasing returns, while the latter is somewhat arbitrary. For instance, 50 percent of capital and road property are deemed variable (STB 2010, 5) . Fourth, URCSs allows for a "makewhole" adjustment that assigns lower costs to unit trains and multicar shipments because of their added efficiencies; but the cost savings is then spread over the other traffic so that all of the railroad variable costs are fully assigned. Finally, and perhaps, most importantly is the fact that common and joint costs must be allocated, but such allocations cannot be made without using an arbitrary mechanism.
The common cost problem is insurmountable. To see this, consider a train that contains shipments of two or more commodities. The total variable cost of the train may be readily defined as all of the costs such as crew wages and fuel that can be avoided by not operating it. The incremental cost of each set of cars is also readily defined. It is the difference between the cost of operating the train with and without each set: for example, the fuel that is saved by not having to move as much weight. However, the locomotive must be used even if only one set of cars is moved. Some of its operating costs, such as crew wages, are included in the train's total variable cost but not in the incremental cost of each set of cars.
Thus the variable cost of any set of cars is simply not defined, so that any allocation of the total variable cost of the train among sets of cars is inherently arbitrary and has no basis in economic theory.
Christensen Associates (2009) examined URCS-based revenue/variable cost (R/VC) ratios using URCS and the STB's Carload Waybill Sample from 2001-2008. They found that the percentage of tonmiles that move with rates that are less than these apparent "variable costs" ranged from 21 to 34 percent.
If URCS were a valid measure of incremental cost, this would not be consistent with profit maximization.
In response, the STB noted that this finding was due in part to the fact that URCS is not a measure of short-run variable costs but rather a measure of intermediate-run variable costs made on a system average basis that includes cost items such as rails and ties that are fixed in the short term (STB 2010). Of course, this points to the arbitrariness of cost allocation --in this case, of rail and tie costs, which are depreciable items and are indeed fixed and not variable. Moreover, it underscores the unsuitability of URCS variable cost as a yardstick to evaluate common carrier rates.
In view of the fundamental problems of the URCS, the Study Committee concluded (TRB 2015, p. 195 ) that "URCS is neither an economically meaningful nor a reliable tool for making regulatory determinations about eligibility to pursue rate relief. Furthermore, the deficiencies of URCS cannot be overcome by revising it. No allocation of common costs can produce an economically valid and reliable measure of the variable cost of a shipment." While the use of a cost allocation system such as URCS to evaluate common carrier rates with an arbitrary markup standard (180 percent) may have been the best available approach in the immediate post-Staggers period, a better approach is now available, as we discuss below.
III.b Market Dominance
If a contested common carrier tariff rate exceeds 180 percent of URCS-defined variable costs, the STB must assess whether the carrier has "market dominance" (Eaton and Center (1985) and Wilson (1996) ):
whether there is an "absence of effective competition from other rail carriers or modes of transportation for the transportation to which the rate applies" (49 USC §10707). 20 Currently, such assessments are made on a case-by-case basis and typically focus on the shipper's proximity to other railroads and modes.
However, prior to 1999, these competitive assessments also included product and geographic competition.
These latter were excluded 1998 by the STB, which held that taking these factors into account significantly impeded efficient processing of the proceedings and presented undue burdens and obstacles for shippers' challenging rates (STB Ex Parte No. 627, December 10, 1998) .
With the exclusion of geographic and product competition considerations, the STB reported that rate cases proceeded faster, but it has recently raised concerns that assessments of market dominance will eventually slow and deter rate challenges. It has stated that "new cases involving challenges to dozens, if not hundreds, of transportation rates raise complex market dominance issues. Without some more objective means of resolving these issues quickly, the market dominance inquiry will soon dwarf the rate reasonableness inquiry." 21 To deal with this, regulators have used URCS-based R/VC ratios to estimate the highest price that a railroad could charge without causing diversion of traffic to trucks, so as to assess market dominance more quickly.
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20 It is noted that the presence of competition may reflect the so-called "Cellophane Fallacy" wherein the presence of competition may reflect higher monopoly prices. Indeed, as pointed out by a reviewer, a profit-maximizing railroad should always be maintaining a price (rate) for a movement at a level where a higher rate would cause too much of the traffic to be lost (diverted to trucks, etc., or just evaporated). So, there should never be an apparent "absence of competition. however, the agency needed to establish how high the R/VC percentage could go before attracting truck competition. To do this, STB consulted URCS to calculate an R/VC that the railroad would need to average for all of its potentially high (>180 percent) R/VC traffic in order to earn a return on investment
More recently, the American Association of Railroads (AAR) petitioned the STB to restore consideration of product and geographic competition. The STB ruled against the petition, holding that the railroads did not offer a practical framework that could be used in proceedings to implement consideration of these factors (STB Ex Parte No. 717). Excluding evidence that tends to favor the railroads tends to bias decisions against them, however. The Study Committee (TRB 2015, p. 206) concluded that to do so on procedural grounds was inappropriate; it found that "there should be no restrictions on types of evidence -such as that pertaining to product and geographic competition -that can be introduced to assess market dominance." It noted that antitrust agencies routinely and expeditiously consider evidence on product and geographic competition and argued (Ibid., p. 197) that "strict timelines for reviews are fundamental in preventing delays in market dominance inquiries. With time limits, categorical limits on evidence are unnecessary."
III.c Rate Reasonableness Standards
If a challenged rate exceeds 180 percent of URCS-defined variable cost and the STB finds that market dominance exists, there are three different methods that are currently used in judging the reasonableness of a rate. The traditional method is a Stand-Alone Cost (SAC) test, which was introduced by the ICC in 1985. The STB announced two simplified procedures in 1997: "Simplified SAC" and Three-Benchmark" rules.
The 1985 Coal Rate Guidelines defined the SAC criterion: The Guidelines asserted that "captive shippers could not be required to continue to pay differentially higher rates than other shippers when some or all of that differential is no longer necessary to ensure a financially sound carrier capable of meeting its current and future service needs" (ICC 1985, p. 11) . However, the ICC did not explain how to implement the constraint and whether the application of a firm wide revenue adequacy constraint implied equal to the cost of capital. (The idea was that the traffic above 180 percent R/VC is primarily responsible for the railroad's revenue adequacy.) STB then compared this average R/VC with the R/VC that would trigger truck competition. STB ruled that the latter exceeding the former would indicate that trucks do not provide an effective means of competition. Because the URCS variable cost numbers are essentially arbitrary, so is this procedure.
an intention to scrutinize, or even cap, a railroad's overall profitability. In addition to revenue adequacy, the Guidelines asserted that a shipper should not bear the cost of demonstrated management inefficiencies and should not be required to bear the cost of facilities or services from which it derives no benefits. ICC declared that such "[c]ross-subsidization of other shippers is effectively precluded" (ICC 1985, p. 4) .
Operationally, the ICC declared that a shipper could not be charged more than the stand-alone cost of providing service. SAC is defined as a cost that "approximates the full economic costs, including a normal profit, which need to be met for an efficient producer to provide service to the shipper(s)
identified" (ICC 1985, p. 7) . In other words, the SAC is the cost that a railroad would incur if it only provided the single service in question, without supplying additional services that share the production facilities. Of course, this cost cannot be directly observed. In order to apply the test, it is necessary to design in great detail a railroad to perform the single service in question and to estimate the costs that the hypothetical railroad would incur. The ICC introduced the SAC test, the stated purpose of which was to estimate a competitive rate level "to determine the least cost at which an efficient competitor could provide the [stand-alone] service" (ICC 1985, p. 15) . That estimated rate level would thus "represent the theoretical maximum rate that a railroad could levy on shippers without substantial diversion of traffic to a hypothetical competing service" (ICC 1985, p. 6 ).
The rationale for the application of the SAC test to railroads has been criticized. As discussed in Pittman (2010) the SAC test was introduced in the late 1970s in the context of the regulation of the Bell System, then a telecommunications monopoly. 23 The basic assumption made in theoretical analysis in that context was that a regulated monopolist with scale and scope economies and a zero economic profit constraint sets prices to groups of customers. Because of the profit constraint, any rate that the utility charges to one group above the SAC of supplying service to that group necessarily means other customers must be paying less than the incremental cost of providing them service. Thus the SAC test offers a fairness rationale for the setting of regulated rates for different customers. 23 The seminal paper was Faulhaber (1975) .
Moreover, since competitive entry in telecommunications was relatively easy, particularly against a regulated monopoly that could not respond by cutting price, a competitor might well enter to serve a group that is being charged above its SAC, even if the entrant was less efficient than the incumbent. Such entry could be socially undesirable.
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This efficiency rationale for a SAC test has very little relevance to railroad regulation, since the prospect that high rates would invite inefficient railroad entry, with its large fixed and sunk costs, is practically zero. Moreover, as Pittman (2010) notes, railroads are not utilities with rates that are fully regulated, nor are they subject to a profit constraint that precludes them from earning positive economic profits. Thus a railroad, not facing a risk of competitive entry, is highly unlikely to reduce its total profit by passing along revenues earned from one group of shippers to supply subsidized service to others. In other words, there is little risk of inefficient entry or unfair cross subsidies in the railroad context.
The absence of any legitimate risk of inefficient entry or shipper cross-subsidies, and with it the lack of concern over efficiency or fairness effects arising from such entry or cross-subsidies, makes the conceptual basis for applying a SAC test to railroad rate regulation highly questionable. The test might still be useful in principle in ensuring that a railroad does not try to defend a disputed rate by pointing to costs that actually arise from management inefficiencies. The simulated, stand-alone railroad should be designed to be efficient and thus to reveal any such inefficiencies to preclude such a defense. While the Coal Rate Guidelines make clear that part of SAC's purpose is to identify such management inefficiencies, 25 that purpose appears highly questionable today in light of the railroads' own profit incentives, which should motivate management efficiency; and it seems doubtful that regulators have the ability actually to detect inefficiencies in the operation of complex modern railroad systems. 24 Of course, even an inefficient entrant can improve social welfare if it causes the price to fall sufficiently so that the welfare triangle gain exceeds the loss from the inefficient production. See Economides and White (1995) . 25 Indeed, the second constraint of the Coal Rate Guidelines specifies that "a captive coal shipper would not be required to bear the cost of demonstrated management inefficiencies in the carrier's operations and pricing structure" (ICC 1985, p. 2 The SAC test was initially designed for rate disputes involving coal, which is usually shipped in large volumes on a regular basis over fixed traffic corridors. The evidentiary rules have had to be modified for use by shippers whose flows do not dominate a corridor. In particular shippers can propose the inclusion of other "crossover" traffic that crosses over (i.e., also runs on the tracks in) the corridor at issue and contributes profits that would effectively lower the revenue that a stand-alone carrier would require to maintain the service. For shippers of relatively small quantities, the profit that is earned from this crossover traffic is crucial to the determination of rate reasonableness. These profits are calculated based on the aforementioned URCS-based R/VC ratios of traffic in the defendant railroad's network, however, and are thus inherently unreliable. In addition, there are no obvious economic principles that the STB can use to decide whether or not specific portions of crossover traffic should be included. Thus the SAC test becomes unreliable in principle outside the coal context, as well as imposing a heavy burden on shippers and lacking a sound conceptual foundation.
If the STB finds that revenue of the defendant railroad exceeds the revenue needed by the standalone railroad (after any profits from any crossover traffic are factored in), it will find the rate unreasonable. The rate that is associated with the stand-alone railroad then becomes the maximum reasonable rate, and is the basis for reparations. Since 1996, there have been 50 cases that were considered under the SAC standard. Of the 50, there were 32 coal, one grain, one mineral and sixteen chemical cases, with dispositions summarized in Table 3 .
Insert Table 3
In order to reduce costs and permit shorter proceedings, both the simplified SAC and threebenchmark procedures (that are discussed below) restrict the evidence that the parties can submit and set a time limit on decisions (STB Ex Parte No. 646-1, September 5, 2007). The STB is required to decide the case within 120 days of the close of arguments, and parties are required to participate in a 20-day nonbinding mediation process at the outset of the case. Unfortunately, despite the profound flaws in URCS, both procedures make heavy use of the cost estimates that it produces.
The simplified SAC is conceptually the same as a full SAC case, but instead of requiring the design of a hypothetical stand-alone railroad, it requires estimation of the SAC of providing the current service with its current traffic on the actual railroad involved. The core analysis is thus an assessment of the existing railroad facility rather than the design of an efficient railroad that is optimized for the traffic at issue. Litigants must estimate the returns that are necessary to replicate the existing facility using replacements costs and URCS to estimate operating costs. Until 2012, reparations under this process were limited to $5 million, but this limit was removed in 2012. The costs of simplified SAC are (of course) lower than traditional SAC, but they are still sizable; one estimate is that the cost of bringing a case is about $4 million (STB Ex Parte No. 715, Rate Regulation Reforms, July 25, 2012). In any case, only five simplified SAC cases were brought from 1999-2014.
The three-benchmark process is the most streamlined of the three options, and the least costly to use (estimated to be $250,000), but is limited to a $4 million cap on rate relief (STB Ex Parte No. 715, Rate Regulation Reforms, July 25, 2012). In such a case, the STB compares the URCS-derived R/VC of the disputed rate with the average R/VC of the portion of the defendant railroad's other "potentially captive" traffic that has an R/VC higher than 180 percent; this is one benchmark. For a second benchmark, STB compares the disputed rate's R/VC with the average R/VC of the railroad's traffic that most resembles the traffic at issue with regard to such characteristics as commodity type, carload size, and travel distance. Finally, STB compares the disputed rate's R/VC with calculations of the average markup that the railroad is presumed to need on all of its potentially captive traffic to make the railroad revenue adequate.
Through 2014, only five cases have been brought under the three benchmark criteria, and all were by chemical shippers. Shipper groups argued that caps on awards were too low to justify the expense of bringing a case and that the evidentiary burdens, uncertainties and procedural delay remained too great.
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III.d. Findings and Recommendations
The Staggers Act called on regulators to use a measure of cost as a benchmark for judging rates.
But, as we have discussed and the Study Committee found, both the URCS and any other costing system that is based on the allocation of accounting costs will produce arbitrary and inaccurate estimates of the costs of individual shipments. Moreover, a better benchmark is now available more than three decades after Staggers. As Table 1 makes clear, the rates of most rail shipments are not regulated, either because they involve exempted commodities or because they have been negotiated in private contracts. Together, these "non-regulated" movements provide a wealth of information on prices that are shaped by competition. Specifically, this information, supplemented by information on competitive structures of individual markets, can be used to develop models that predict common carrier rates that would have been charged in the presence of effective competition; these predictions can then be used as a benchmark for any common carrier rate. Indeed the Study Committee developed and presented such a benchmarking procedure as a proof of concept (TRB 2015, Appendix B).
The Study Committee (TRB 2015, p. 206) screening rates for eligibility to be challenged." The proposal, which would almost certainly require new legislation, is that these benchmarks be used by shippers instead of URCS to identify rates that can be challenged as potentially unreasonable. With a more reliable benchmark used as the threshold for eligibility for rate relief, it would be possible to move beyond the unsatisfactory tests that the STB has heretofore used to judge rate reasonableness --without threatening railroad revenue adequacy.
To this end, the Study Committee proposed (TRB 2015, pp. 206-7 ) that a final-offer arbitration procedure with a strict time limit be used to determine whether a potentially unreasonable rate is being charged by a railroad with market dominance and whether the rate is in fact unreasonable. The first phase of the arbitration proceeding would be whether market dominance is present or not. In this phase, both shippers and the railroads would submit evidence without restriction but with strict time constraints. If the arbitrator does not find market dominance, the proceeding would end.
If the railroad is found to have dominance, evidence on rate reasonability would be presented with strict time constraints, and both sides would make their final offers regarding the outcome of the process. These would include maximum and minimum reasonable rates (from shipper(s) and the railroad, respectively) and perhaps aspects of service quality or (as discussed below) reciprocal switching. The arbitrator should be instructed to keep the offers private and choose only one side's full offer without compromise.
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Strict time limits are commonly used in various forms of litigation, notably in complex cases involving patents. Similarly, final-offer arbitration has long been used in Canada to resolve rate disputes with considerable success (Cairns 2014) . Notably, the Canadian process does not require shippers to pass any sort of cost-based or competitive rate-based test in order to have access to arbitration.
IV. OTHER REGULATORY PROVISIONS
IV.a Revenue Adequacy
Revenue adequacy as an explicit goal of regulatory policy dates to the 4-R Act and a period in history in which the industry was in financial ruin, facilities and service had deteriorated, and bankruptcies were commonplace. The Staggers Rail Act added the requirement that regulators "maintain and revise as necessary standards and procedures for establishing revenue levels for all carriers . . . that are adequate, under honest, economical, and efficient management, to cover total operating expenses, including depreciation and obsolescence, plus a reasonable and economic profit or return (or both) on capital employed in the business. . . ." (49 USC §10704). Regulators are directed to use these standards and procedures to "annually determine which rail carriers are earning adequate revenues" and to make "an adequate and continuing effort to assist those carriers in attaining [adequate] revenue levels" (49 USC §10704).
The annual determinations were developed and modified in a series of rulemakings over the last few decades. 29 Each year, the STB's determination is based on a formulaic comparison of each railroad's return on investment (ROI) with an industry-wide measure of the cost of capital; and if the RIO exceeds the cost of capital, the railroad is declared to be revenue adequate.
This process is treated as quite important in the Coal Rate Guidelines, which assert that a railroad's revenue adequacy status may be used in rate reasonableness determination (ICC 1985, p. 11) .
Specifically, rate increases could be warranted to achieve and maintain revenue adequacy; and that if a railroad is revenue adequate, shippers "should not be required to continue to pay differentially higher rates than other shippers…" (ICC 1985, p. 11) . While the results of annual revenue adequacy findings 29 The ICC defined adequate revenues as those achieving the level necessary for a railroad to compete equally with other firms for available financing to maintain, replace, modernize, and, where appropriate, expand its facilities and services. ICC Ex Parte No. 393, Standards for Railroad Revenue Adequacy.
have not been used to adjudicate a railroad rate challenge, revenue adequacy findings have been used in an interstate pipeline case.
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For 20 years, all Class I railroads fell short of revenue adequacy, but the picture has been more mixed in recent years. The railroads have claimed that revenue adequacy should remain a priority and regulatory oversight should not be strengthened, while shippers claim that the STB process understates railroads' financial health and is inconsistent with other evidence.
Although careful monitoring of "revenue adequacy" was warranted in the mid-1970s and in the immediate years following Staggers because the railroad industry was near collapse, in recent years, railroads have generally achieved financial health and have been able to attract capital and make substantial investments. Continuation of annual revenue adequacy determinations might be considered innocuous; but it does prolong the misguided view --plainly at odds with the thrust of the reforms that culminated in the Staggers Act --that a finding of revenue adequacy should be used to regulate rates. The Study Committee (TRB 2015, p. 202) found that this process no longer provides meaningful information for policy and should be replaced by a less frequent but deeper monitoring and assessment of the railroad industry's economic performance, competitive conditions, and rate and service levels to inform railroad regulatory decisions and public policies broadly.
30 The STB regulates interstate pipelines that carry products other than petroleum, natural gas, and water. In 2000, shippers of anhydrous ammonia successfully challenged the rates that were charged by a pipeline operator by using the revenue adequacy standard from the Coal Rate Guidelines. See STB Docket No. 41685, CF Industries, Inc., v. Koch Pipeline Company, LP, May 3, 2000.
IV.b Mergers
Following passage of the Staggers Act, there has been a tremendous consolidation of the industry which took the industry from 40 Class I railroads in 1980 to seven today. This reduction is due to a reclassification of Class I carriers (Bitzan and Wilson (2007) ) from Class I to Class II carriers; to bankruptcies; but most of the change occurred through mergers in the 1980s and 1990s. In most industries, the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission review mergers that are economically significant. These agencies consider only whether the transaction will "substantially lessen completion," under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Railroad mergers must instead be approved by the STB (and formerly by the ICC). The STB is required to consider mergers using a broader "public interest"
standard, which involves considering effects on labor, safety, community development, and other railroads.
The public interest standard originated with passage of the Transportation Act of 1940. There were only a few mergers considered until the 1950s and 1960s, and the public interest standard was employed to review them. Most of the merger review decisions during this time period focused on railroad finances rather than on protecting competition (Gallamore and Meyer (2014) . Mergers of regionally competing railroads were approved to reduce parallel capacity, while end-to-end mergers were denied to protect incumbent railroads. 31 Traffic protection conditions were often required when mergers were approved, both to lessen anticompetitive effects and to minimize adverse effects on other railroads (Crum and Allen 1986, p. 47) . The era's mergers of rival railroads were deemed necessary to promote financial stability, which was viewed as a more pressing goal than achieving the single-line efficiencies from end-to-end mergers or preserving competition.
31 Gallamore and Meyer (2014, p. 137) note that from the mid-1950s through the 1960s the ICC approved 16 major mergers, only two or three of which had mostly end-to-end characteristics. They report that the ICC turned down only four major mergers during the 1950s and 1960s, and two were end-to-end.
With respect to mergers, the 4R Act was "intended to encourage mergers, consolidations, and joint use of facilities that tend to rationalize and improve the Nation's rail system" 32 It provided for an expedited procedure and a more extensive set of public interest criteria, which expired January 1, 1982.
When Staggers was passed, it added a consideration of the adverse effects on competition among railroads, and also established time limits for the process. This later was intended to hasten what had become a slow and uncertain merger review process.
Passage of the 4R and Staggers Acts led to another wave of mergers through the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, the largest of the nation's largest railroads were formed. These are the CSX and NS railroads that were formed in the 1980s and the BNSF and UPSP railroads that were formed in the 1990s, as well as the acquisition of the ConRail by NS and CSX in the late 1990s. Most of the mergers took place prior to the creation of the STB, but the UP-SP merger and the acquisition of ConRail by CSX and NS were approved by the STB. The UP-SP merger was particularly controversial in that the DOJ argued that the merger would produce a reduction in rail competition in a large number of markets, as the unified railroad would exercise market power unilaterally and through coordinated behavior with BN: the single remaining competitor (STB NOR No. 32760, August 6, 1996, p. 89).
In granting approval, STB placed greater emphasis on the financial benefits of the merger. The financially weak SP would become part of a stronger system that would be in a better position to compete aggressively with the newly merged and more efficient BN, to the benefit of shippers in western markets (Kwoka and White 2004; Nottingham 2007; Conant 2004 ). In addition, the UP offered and the STB accepted the granting of traffic rights to BN to mitigate losses in competition.
The economic effects of the mergers that were approved by ICC and STB during the first two decades after the Staggers Rail Act's passage have been extensively studied (e.g., Pittman (1990); Berndt et al. (1993); Wilson (1997); Chapin and Schmidt (1999) ; Grimm and Plaistow (1999) ; Bitzan and Wilson (2007) ; Winston et al. (2011) ). The studies generally find that consolidation activity contributed significantly to the industry's shedding of uneconomic legacy capacity and the resultant cost savings, with results depending on the degree to which a merger had vertical (involving end-to-end connections) and horizontal (involving parallel capacity) features. Efficiency gains, stemming importantly from the Class I railroads focusing on long trains that travel long distances, were largely passed on to shippers through lower rates and enhanced service.
Since the acquisition of ConRail by NS and CSX in the late 1990s, there have been no mergers between Class I railroads. In 1999, BN and CN applied to merge. By this time, the STB had come to believe that the industry's excess capacity had been largely eliminated through line abandonments and the earlier mergers; hence, the potential for additional efficiencies from further consolidations had been exhausted for the most part (STB Ex Parte No. 582, April 7, 2000) . The agency raised concern that another merger would prompt a final round of mergers involving the few Class I railroads that remained (STB Ex Parte No. 582, April 7, 2000) . Furthermore, the BN-CN merger was proposed in the wake of prolonged service disturbances after UP's integration of SP. STB declared a 15-month moratorium on further reviews until a reassessment of its merger evaluation criteria was complete (STB Ex Parte No. 582, April 7, 2000) . BN and CN withdrew their application, and STB introduced its Major Rail Consolidation Procedures (STB Ex Parte No. 582-1, June 7, 2001 ). In these guidelines, it became clear that there would henceforth be a higher burden of proof to demonstrate that public benefits would outweigh anticompetitive effects and that it would consider the cumulative effects of consolidation on the competitiveness of the industry.
The Study Committee found (TRB 2015, p. 204 ) that "there is no longer an economically sound argument for retaining the ambiguous public interest standard" and that the well-defined competitionbased appraisal process employed by antitrust enforcers be used instead. Specifically, the Committee recommended that approval of railroad mergers should be passed to the Department of Justice, which employs well-defined and transparent analytic methods, evidentiary procedures, and review timelines to evaluate merger proposals in a wide range of industries. Further, the Department of Justice is already required to advise STB and has advised the STB on the competitive impacts of major railroad mergers;
the Committee would require the STB to advise the Department instead.
IV.c Reciprocal Switching
Prior to the Staggers Act, regulated rates were largely equalized across shippers, and shippers had little incentive to seek alternative routings. However, under Staggers rates became much more flexible, and the incentive changed --especially for bottleneck routes. Essentially, a bottleneck occurs when a shipper seeks to ship from one location to another but must use the services of a railroad for which there is no realistic alternative for part of the movement. The shipper can only interconnect at some point in the routing if there is a rate offered to the interchange point and if the rate to the interchange point warrants interchange to another railroad. This type of "no-alternative" problem arises commonly when a shipper has access to only one railroad at the origin or destination of a shipment that will have its line haul on a different railroad.
Provisions in the Staggers Act had the practical effect of allowing a railroad to cancel interline and terminal access agreements, which reinforced the ability of railroads to control bottleneck traffic (GAO, 1987) . However, the Staggers Act also allowed regulators to order a railroad to allow competitor access to bottleneck traffic if the order was deemed "practicable and in the public interest." 33 This access could simply be a mandate that railroads interchange traffic (49 USC §10705(a)(1)), but could also be a requirement that a railroad be granted the right to operate on another's track within terminal areas that were bottlenecks (49 USC §111103(c)(1)), or an order that a railroad must accept shipper requests to haul traffic short distances over the bottleneck segment to and from a nearby interchange with a second railroad that would perform the line-haul move. This last is commonly referred to as reciprocal 33 "Practicable and in the public interest" was historically interpreted by ICC as requiring the demonstration of "some actual necessity or compelling reason" why such an arrangement should be ordered. Such a showing would need to entail "more than a mere desire on the part of shippers or other interested parties for something that would be convenient or desirable to them" [Jamestown Chamber of Commerce v. Jamestown, W. & N.R. Co., 195 ICC 289, 291 (1933) ].
switching: The bottleneck monopoly railroad can be ordered to deliver traffic to another railroad at an interchange point. Under Staggers, regulators can order such arrangements not only if practical and in the public interest but also if deemed "necessary to provide competitive rail service."
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In implementing the Staggers Rail Act, the ICC took the view that its authority to order competitive access to bottleneck traffic was not meant to be used freely to inject more competition into rail markets but instead to address specific anticompetitive behavior. In its Intramodal Competition Rules, 35 the agency declared that through-route, terminal access, and reciprocal switching arrangements affecting bottleneck traffic may be prescribed only if "necessary to remedy or prevent an act that is contrary to the competition policies" of the law (49 CFR 1144.2(a)(1)).
Shippers have unsuccessfully challenged these rules in court. 36 The ICC maintained that the law merely authorized --but did not require --it to order bottleneck access arrangements and that the focus on anticompetitive conduct that leads to unreasonable service offerings is consistent with the policy. It further maintained that shippers are eligible to file a rate case where a rate in a market lacking effective competition exceeds 180 percent of URCS-determined variable cost. Shippers counter with the notion that Congress gave the regulatory authority the power to order reciprocal switching when necessary to provide competitive rail service. In doing so, Congress meant to increase the options that are available to the STB in addressing the concerns of aggrieved shippers and in providing a mechanism for controlling railroad market power through competitive access rather than only by prescribing maximum rates after disputes.
37
While not generally used in the U.S., reciprocal switching has long been used in Canada (Cairns 2014 In the U.S. there have been several proposals to require more extensive use of reciprocal switching.
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The Study Committee did not reach a conclusion as to the desirability of any of them.
Instead, it simply recommended (TRB 2015, pp. 204-5 ) that the practical prohibition on reciprocal switching as a remedy for an unreasonable rate should be ended. Specifically, under the arbitration-based rate oversight regime that the Committee proposed, the parties should be allowed to propose reciprocal switching arrangements in their final offers, and the arbitrator should be empowered to order such arrangements.
IV.d Data Collection
The Study Committee had several recommendations regarding the STB's data collection activities (TRB 2015, pp. 216-8) . Most importantly, the Committee recommended that the STB conduct a strategic review of its data programs with the goal of simplifying or discontinuing the reporting of data that are rarely (if ever) used. It should seek to improve the accuracy of the Carload Waybill Sample to implement 38 One recent example of a legislative proposal to mandate reciprocal switching to enhance competition is the Railroad Competition and Service Improvement Act of 2007 (S. 953 and H.R. 2125). The bill would have defined "areas of inadequate competition" if shippers pay rates above 180 percent of R/VC and are served by a single railroad. In such defined areas, the bill would authorize the STB to order reciprocal switching and terminal trackage rights.
the benchmark tool for rate assessment described above. The Committee also asked the STB to move toward making raw data available under conditions that guarantee confidentiality (as the Bureau of the Census and other federal agencies have long done) and away from the provision of "masked" versions of the data --particularly to other federal agencies that use it to assess the cost and benefits of policy options that involve, in some cases, billions of taxpayer dollars, but also to researchers who could advance the understanding of the industry.
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The Committee also concluded that the STB should reassess the collection of detailed railroad accounting, financial and operations data. There are considerable informational burdens on the industry that could certainly be reduced without compromising the STB's ability to function or scholars' ability to study the industry. As noted above, the Study Committee concluded that URCS should be abandoned, and its role in the rate evaluation process should be replaced by competitive rate benchmarking. This would substantially reduce the information that is needed for regulatory purposes.
Finally, there are some needs for additional data. The common carrier obligation requires railroads to provide service to shippers on reasonable request. While Staggers preserved the duty to provide common carrier service, it did not define either the minimum level of service that should be supplied or the rates that could be charged (except that they must be reasonable). While there is ample information on rates, almost no information on service quality is collected. The Study Committee found that service quality data are crucial to identifying whether common carrier service is substantially inferior to that of contract and exempt service and generally to evaluating periodic shipper complaints of inadequate service. A model of shipment-level data exists in the waybill sampling program, and it can be easily adapted for regulatory use to measure changes in common carrier service quality over time and space.
V. CONCLUSIONS
39 The Study Committee benefitted enormously from access to the raw Carload Waybill Sample data.
Federal regulation of railroads began with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. By the 1970s the freight rail industry was in serious financial distress, and a series of laws --culminating in the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 --aimed to restore it to health by rolling back regulation and placing more reliance on market forces. Regulation remained, however, and 35 years after the passage of the Staggers Act, a
Congressionally--mandated study concluded that freight rail regulation should be modernized to make it a better fit to the radically transformed freight rail industry that had emerged after Staggers (TRB 2015) .
Through the 1980s and 1990s, railroads shed unprofitable line, merged, introduced pricing innovations that favored efficient movement of goods, and made substantial investments. This resulted in a dramatic reduction in rates, costs, and the number of firms, as well as substantial improvements in the railroads' financial health. Indeed, by the late 1990s, Staggers had succeeded in spurring the development of a modern and more efficient freight rail industry that was better able to compete with trucks and waterways, and that responded to shipper needs with less regulatory control and oversight.
Staggers was passed during a time when the industry was in dire straits, and many of its provisions were designed to improve the financial condition of the industry. However, the industry is now viable, and many of the Staggers provisions are outdated. Importantly, the emergence of competition makes it feasible to drop the profoundly flawed URCS and instead to use market data to develop economically sound benchmarks for rate evaluation. The Study Committee's recommendations include the following:
1. Abandon URCS. This rail costing model makes arbitrary cost allocations that are flawed conceptually and empirically, and it cannot be fixed;
2. Repeal the 180 percent of revenue-to-variable cost, by directing the USDOT to develop, test, and refine competitive benchmarking methods to identify rates that are questionable. The current method requires URCS, which is flawed and the 180 percent rule is arbitrary. Since deregulation, data for a set of movements that are market-determined has evolved and can be used to establish benchmarks.
3. Continue to make entitlement to rate relief contingent on a finding of market dominance, but do not limit the evidence that can be used. The primary purpose is to avoid delays in the processing of cases, but also afford all evidence that may limit or not limit railroad prices.
4. Replace STB rate reasonableness with an arbitration procedure that compels faster rulings on disputes that involve rates that are found eligible to be challenged because they substantially exceed benchmarks. As shown in Canada, independent arbitration can be used effectively, and strict time limits and a final-offer rule can provide for evidence, arguments, and possible remedies in a timely fashion.
5. End the practical prohibition on reciprocal switching as a remedy for an unreasonable rate. In the arbitrations, allow the parties to propose reciprocal switching arrangements to resolve the disputes.
6. End annual revenue inadequacy determinations and instead require periodic assessments of the industrywide economic and competitive conditions. Most railroads are now financially sound, and the need for an annual declaration of revenue adequacy is no longer needed. But,
given the import of the industry, the committee holds that periodic oversight is needed.
7. Transfer merger review authority to the antitrust agencies, which then would apply antitrust principles rather than a public interest standard. Given the evolution of the industry, primarily through mergers, the general public interest standard has evolved into one that stresses the competitive concerns of mergers. This is the role of the antitrust agencies, which should solicit the views of the STB on railroad mergers.
8. Require a strategic review of STB data programs to identify opportunities to simplify or discontinue the reporting of little-used data; to refine the data collection to improve the accuracy, timeliness, and availability of the Waybill Sample to implement competitive benchmarking; to reassess the collection of detailed railroad accounting, financial, and operating requirements in the context of need for periodic economic and competition studies of the industry; and, finally, to obtain shipment-level data on service quality to monitor railroads' responsiveness to the common carrier obligation.
While partial deregulation has resurrected the industry, the evolution of the industry and regulation allows refinements in the regulations that ameliorate some of the pitfalls of modern day regulation --i.e., a reduction the regulatory burdens faced by railroads --while giving shippers better protection against unreasonable rates. Adoption of these recommendations would go far to replace and 
